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CONSUMER NEWS
By Thomas A. McCann*
5 th Circuit Ruling: A Tough Pill to Swallow
for Katrina Policyholders
Big insurance companies won a major victory this August,
and Katrina-ravaged policy holders were handed a tough blow, when
the United States Court of Appeals for the 5 th Circuit ruled that the
companies' "all-risk" insurance policies excluded the extensive water
damage to residents' properties caused by Hurricane Katrina.'
The federal appeal dealt with four of more than 40 pending
cases related to the hurricane that had been consolidated for pre-trial
purposes in the Eastern District of Louisiana.2 Each plaintiff in the
case was a policyholder with homeowners, renters, or commercial
property insurance whose property was damaged during the Katrina-
related flooding of New Orleans in August 2005.'
At stake is potentially $1 billion in insurance payouts for
flood damage throughout the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Katrina.4
The appeal features more than 40 named plaintiffs, including Xavier
University, and more than 15 insurance company defendants, includ-
ing Allstate Insurance Co., Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Amer-
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' Becky Yerak, Insurers Win Key Katrina Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 2007, at
Cl.
2 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 2007).
3 Id.
4 Yerak, supra note 1, at C 1.
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ica, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., and Unitrin Preferred Insur-
ance Co.
5
The plaintiff policyholders had argued that even though their
policies had specific exclusions for any damage from "flood," the
damage from Katrina was not the result of natural flooding. 6 A negli-
gently built canal system, they argued, actually caused the damage.
Thus, the terms of the insurance policies were ambiguous, the policy-
holders argued, and should be interpreted in favor of coverage.
Plaintiffs in all four cases of the appeal alleged that Hurricane
Katrina was not the main cause of their water damage. One set of
plaintiffs, the "Vanderbrook plaintiffs," alleged that "sometime be-
tween 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., before the full force of [the hurricane]
reached the City of New Orleans, a small section of the concrete out-
fall canal wall known as the 17th Street Canal, suddenly broke, caus-
ing water to enter the streets of the city." 8 Another set of plaintiffs,
the "Chehardy plaintiffs," alleged that the city's levee system was
breached in at least eight places, causing approximately 80 percent of
Orleans parish to become submerged.9
The Chehardy plaintiffs referred in their complaint to engi-
neering reports which concluded that "the vast amounts of the water
that entered the [c]ity... and the surrounding parishes came about as
the result of levee failures caused by negligent design, negligent
maintenance and/or inadequate materials and not by topping of the
levees."' 0 The plaintiffs also cited testimony of the chief of the Army
Corps of Engineers, stating that "the Corps neglected to consider the
possibility that the levee walls atop the 17 th Street Canal levee would
lurch away from their footings under significant water pressure and
eat away at the earthen barriers below... [t]he levees simply failed to
work the way they were supposed to work."" The Chehardy plain-
tiffs further alleged that the levee breach was at least partially due to
an inadequately moored barge that crashed into the levee wall, com-
5 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 196-203.
6 Id. at 196.
7id.
8 Id. at 196-97.
9 Id. at 200.
10 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 200.
1 Id.
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promising the levee's wall integrity. The remaining two sets of plain-
tiffs in the appeal alleged similar facts.'
2
Each plaintiff in the appeal had purchased what is called an
"all-risk" insurance policy, "a special type of insurance extending to
risks not usually contemplated, and generally allows recovery for all
fortuitous losses, unless the policy expressly excludes the loss from
coverage."'
3
Most of the insurance policies at issue in the case contained
terms similar to those in the policy issued by defendant Hanover In-
surance Company. As an example, the Hanover policy provided cov-
erage for risk of direct physical loss to structures on the property as
well as for certain risks of loss to personal property, as long as the
loss was not an excluded peril.' 4 The Hanover policy contains this
exclusion for flood:
We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by
any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of
any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any
sequence to the loss...
Water Damage, meaning: . . . Flood, surface water, waves,
tidal water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any
of these, whether or not driven by the wind... "
The plaintiffs brought various claims against the insurers, in-
cluding breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and insurance bad faith under Louisiana state
law. 16 The Vanderbrook plaintiffs alleged that the policies were con-
tracts of adhesion that were "unduly and unreasonably complex," and
that the flood exclusions were oppressive to consumers and so unrea-
sonably favorable to the insurance companies that the policies were
unconscionable and void.' 7
12 Id.
13 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (E.D.
La. 2006); see also Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Coverage under All-Risk Insur-
ance, 30 A.L.R. 5th 170 (1995).
14 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 197.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 197-203.
'" Id. at 197.
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The Chehardy plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
the efficient proximate causes of their home damage were
"windstorm, acts of negligence, and storm surge, all of which were
covered perils," that "the breaking or failure of boundaries of lakes,
reservoirs, streams, or other bodies of water, was a peril not specifi-
cally excluded by any of the... policies;" and that "[t]he damage
caused by water.. .due to the breaches in the levees... neither falls
within the regular definition of flood, nor within any of the subject
insurance policies' exclusions for flood."'
18
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
agreed, holding that the water damage provisions and the word
"flood" in most of the policies could reasonably be interpreted two
ways: 1) to mean a "flood" caused only by natural events or 2) to
mean a "flood" resulting from both natural causes and negligent or
intentional acts. 19 Thus, the terms of the policies were ambiguous
and should be interpreted in favor of the policy holders.
The district court applied Louisiana canons of construction
and rules of interpretation to the contracts at issue. The district court
stated that insurance exclusions are to be strictly construed, and that
ambiguous policy provisions are to be construed against the insurer. 20
Moreover, a contract of adhesion, executed in a standard form, must
be interpreted in favor of the party that did not write the contract.21
The court cited the Louisiana rule that strict construction applies if
the ambiguous policy provision is susceptible to two or more reason-
able interpretations, and the court ruled that an insurance customer
could have more than one reasonable interpretation of the term
"flood., 22 The court ruled that strict construction should apply.
However, the district court did side with the insurance com-
panies regarding one type of policy, typified by the terms of State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.'s policy with several of the plaintiffs.23
The State Farm policy stated:
18 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 201.
19 Id. at 198.
20 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
21 id.
22 Id.
23 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 197.
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We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which
would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of
the following excluded events. We do not insure for such
loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded event; or
(b) other causes of the loss; (c) whether other causes acted
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to
produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly
or gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, aris-
esfrom natural or external forces, or occurs as a result of
any combination of these:
Water Damage, meaning: (1) flood, surface water, waves,
tidal water, overflow of a body of water, or s ray from any
of these, all whether driven by wind or not...
Regarding the State Farm policy, the district court concluded
that the policy's "lead-in clause," describing external forces, cured
the ambiguity and clearly excluded coverage for all floods, whether25
natural or not. The district court granted State Farm's motions and
dismissed the case against it.26 The district court reached the same
conclusion as to a similar policy from Hartford Insurance Co. of the
Midwest and dismissed that company from the case as well. Howev-
er, the judge declined to dismiss the remaining insurers who did not
have the lead-in clause, allowing the plaintiffs to attempt to prove
that negligent design or maintenance of the levees indeed did cause
their water damage.27
The district court's opinion shocked many on both sides of the
insurance coverage debate and injected new life into claims by prop-
erty owners devastated by hurricanes Katrina and Rita.28 Up to this
point, insurance companies had "years of precedent" on their side.
29
According to legal experts in the Gulf Coast region, the public gener-
ally knew that insurers did not cover flood damage and that at-risk
24 Id. at 197-98.
25 Id. at 198.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Molly McDonough, Defining Flood. Federal Judge's Ruling Has Katrina
Victims Hoping for Coverage Cash, ABA J. EREPORT, Dec. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d8trina.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
29 Id.
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consumers had to purchase flood protection separately from the U.S.
government's National Flood Insurance Program.30
Sensing the implications of his ruling, the district judge put
the case on a fast track to a 5th Circuit appeal.3' On August 2, a
three-judge panel of the 5 h Circuit overturned the district court's rul-
ing.
To determine the scope of the flood exclusions, both the dis-
trict court and appellate court focused on dictionary definitions of the
words "flood," "overflow," and other terms used in the policies. The
district court determined that the word "flood" in standard dictiona-
ries described a natural event caused by rain or tide, not an inunda-
tion of water due to negligence.33 The district court compared the
situation to cases upholding insurance coverage for flooding due to
broken water mains or damage to property from "earth movements"
caused by human error. 34 The district court also stated that many dic-
tionaries used the word "overflow" to define the meaning of flood
and indicated that "overflowing" should be read to mean "overtop-
ping" a water barrier like a riverbank or levee. The court inferred
that because the water did not "overtop" the levee walls in this case,
the breaches did not create a "flood.
3 5
In its review, the appellate court examined definitions of flood
in four different dictionaries, as well as an encyclopedia entry de-
scribing the Johnstown flood of 1899, and disagreed with the district
court.3  The appellate court determined that a flood in its essence
was "an overflowing of water onto land that is normally dry." 37 The
appellate court found that this simple definition of flood was met
when the water from the canal overflowed onto the dry land of New
Orleans.38
30 id.
31 McDonough, supra note 28.
32 Victims of Katrina Lose an Insurance Appeal, Ass'D PRESS, Aug. 3, 2007.
33 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 198.
34 Id.
31 Id. at 214.
6Id. at 211.
37 id.
38 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 211.
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The appellate court also disputed the district court interpreta-
tion of the term "overflow." The appellate court determined the dic-
tionary definition of "overflow" was "to flow over; to overspread or
cover with water or other liquid; to flood or inundate., 39 Thus, the
definition was much broader than simply overtopping a levee wall.
Further, the appellate court noted that a levee is a "flood-control
structure; its very purpose is to prevent the headwaters of a water-
course from overflowing onto certain land areas." 40 The court rea-
soned that even if the levee failure was due to negligent design, it
"does not change the character of the water escaping through the le-
vee's breach; the waters are still floodwaters, and the result is a
flood."
4 1
Thus, the court concluded the flood exclusions, even without
specifically defining the term flood or expressly excluding man-made
negligence, are "unambiguous in the context of this case and what
occurred here fits squarely within the generally prevailing meaning of
the term 'flood.
''42
Insurance industry leaders celebrated the 5th Circuit ruling.
Robert Hartwig, chief economist for the Insurance Information Insti-
tute, called it "an extremely important decision" because of the bil-
lions of dollars at stake. Hartwig said the ruling "sets a
precedent.., shuts down a line of litigation... removes a cloud of
uncertainty hanging over the market and in the long run will provide
better stability for insurers to operate. That will benefit people trying
to rebuild.
4 4
However, the ruling is a disappointment to the many home-
owners left with the damage from Hurricane Katrina. More than
200,000 homes and thousands of businesses were damaged or de-
stroyed, and the relatively small amounts insurers have paid out to
homeowners and businesses for wind damage have been too small for
most people to rebuild.45 The U.S. government promised several bil-
31 Id. at 214.
40 id.
41 id.
42 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 221.
43 Yerak, supra note 1, at C 1.
44 Id.
45 Katrina Victims Win One in Court: Judge Rules Insurance Companies Lia-
ble for Flood-Caused Damage, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2006, at C1.
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lion dollars in aid to the homeowners, but little of the money has
reached the people who need it.
4 6
The Fifth Circuit opinion will ensure, moreover, that more in-
surance providers will adopt State Farm's more explicit exclusions
for "floods" due in part to man-made negligence when they write up
their next round of insurance policies.47
46 id.
47 Yerak, supra note 1, at C 1.
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